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STUDENT COMMENT
THE NEGOTIABLE ORDER OF WITHDRAWAL (NOW)
ACCOUNT: "CHECKING ACCOUNTS" FOR
SAVINGS BANKS?
It has been estimated that of the 439.6 billion dollars on deposit
in savings accounts in banks across the United States, some 71.6 billion
dollars are kept in mutual savings banks.' When considered in conjunc-
tion with the fact that mutual savings banks' are authorized to operate
in only eighteen states,' these figures indicate the considerable public
confidence, as well as private savings, that is placed in these institu-
tions. Throughout their 157-year history, in fact, savings banks have
traditionally maintained as their primary purposes the functions of
1 The figures provided were estimated for 1970. Conference of State Bank Super-
visors, A Profile of State-Chartered Banking 207 (Dec. 1971) [hereinafter cited as
Banking Profile].
2 Banks consist of three principal types: commercial banks, savings banks, and trust
companies. Commercial banks and trust companies may be chartered under either state or
federal law, but savings banks (which are virtually always mutual in nature, see below)
are always state-chartered. Prentice-Hall Encyclopedic Dictionary of Business Finance
48-49 (1960).
Savings and loan associations are not considered to be banks, but rather "[d]epositor-
owned savings associations that have been established to enable their members to finance
the purchase, construction, and repair of homes more easily." Id, at 548. They may be
state or federally chartered. Id.
Savings banks are either mutual savings banks or stock savings banks. Id. at 549. As
defined by federal law:
The term "mutual savings bank" means a bank without capital stock trans-
acting a savings bank business, the net earnings of which inure wholly to the
benefit of its depositors after payment of obligations for any advances by its
organizers.
12 U.S.C. I 1813(f) (1970).
Stock savings banks are "state chartered banking corporations owned by individual
stockholders, which accept only interest-bearing savings deposits . . . . Few such banks
exist today." Prentice-Hall Encyclopedic Dictionary of Business Finance 585 (1960).
This comment will deal solely with mutual savings banks. The terms "savings bank"
and "mutual savings bank" will therefore be used interchangeably.
Under Massachusetts law, a "savings bank" is defined merely as "a savings bank,
institution for savings or savings institution incorporated as such in this commonwealth."
Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 168, $ 1 (1971). However, Incorporated in this definition is the
concept that all Massachusetts savings banks are mutual in nature: "There are and can
be no shares of stock in a Massachusetts savings bank. Such a bank is a purely mutual
institution without stock." Jefferson v. Cox, 246 Mass. 495, 497, 141 N.E. 493, 494 (1923).
See also People v. Franklin Nat'l Bank, 305 N.Y. 453, 461, 113 N.E.2d 796, 799 (1953),
rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Franklin Nat'l Bank v. New York, 347 U.S. 373 (1954),
in which the court said: "[I]n New York savings banks are mutual institutions . . .."
Mutual savings banks are authorized to operate in the following states: Alaska,
Connecticut, Delaware, Indiana, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, New
Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Vermont,
Washington, and Wisconsin. They also operate in Puerto Rico. National Ass'n of Mutual
Savings Banks, Directory and Guide to the Mutual Savings Banks of the United States v
(1969-70).
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encouraging savings and of investing these savings "safely and pro-
ductively."' For these reasons, savings banks have enjoyed substantial
benefits not shared by commercial banks.'
Recently, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts rendered
an opinion which may be a significant step in breaking down the tradi-
tional barriers between mutual savings banks and commercial banking
institutions. In Consumers Savings Bank v. Commissioner of Banks,'
the court upheld the right of Massachusetts savings banks to permit
their depositors to make withdrawals by means of negotiable withdrawal
orders.' The plan set up by the Consumers Savings Bank to implement
this new type of withdrawal procedure is known as the "Negotiable
Order of Withdrawal" (NOW) account.8 It enables the savings bank
customer to maintain a single account that not only earns for him a
higher rate of interest than is normally available in a savings account
at a commercial bank, but also permits him to transfer money to third
parties, as he would from a conventional checking account, through
the use of negotiable instruments drawn on his account. The NOW
accounts have been referred to as being "virtually checking accounts
with interest payments"9—a description that, as will be shown, is not
entirely accurate.
It will be seen that the Consumers decision does not rest on any
consideration of the commercial characteristics of the NOW account
or its potential effect on the competitive balance between savings and
commercial banks. However, the significant impact which the decision
is likely to have on these areas urges an examination of the current
state of relevant banking regulation. It is the purpose of this comment
to examine the potential effect of the NOW account on the banking
industry. After =a brief look at the history of mutual savings banks
and the federal banking legislation of the 1930's, the comment will
4 Hearings on H.R. 5700, H.R. 3287 & H.R. 7440 Before the House Comm. on
Banking & Currency, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2, at 663 (1971) (Prepared Statement of
Harlan J. Swift) [hereinafter cited as Swift].
5 See text at notes 108-10 infra.
Commercial banks are banks that specialize in demand deposits (checking accounts)
and short-term commercial loans, and usually endeavor to attract business enterprises,
rather than individual savers, as their principal customers. See United States v. Philadel-
phia Nat'l Bank, 201 F. Supp. 348, 360 (El). Pa. 1962).
0
 — Mass. —, 282 N.E.2d 416 (1972).
7 Id. at —, 282 N.E.2d' at 417-18. "The negotiable withdrawal orders would be drawn
on a no passbook account and would be payable through a commercial bank or the
Federal Reserve Bank. The orders would be presented to the bank for payment in a daily
clearing, and payment would occur at its offices. The bank would make returns on stop
payment orders, overdrafts, and so forth, and would handle signature verifications." Id.
at —, 282 N.E.2d at 417. In short, the negotiable withdrawal orders would be processed
in the same manner as conventional checks.
8 Although other Massachusetts savings banks are offering this type of account under
other names, such as the "All-in-One" account and the "Two-Way" account, this comment
will refer to them collectively as the NOW account, the name adopted by the Consumers
Savings Bank.
9
 Boston Globe, Jan. 25, 1973, at 47, col. 3.
472
THE NEGOTIABLE ORDER OF WITHDRAWAL (NOW) ACCOUNT
examine the existing federal regulation that appears pertinent to the
authority of mutual savings banks to offer NOW accounts. The legisla-
tive background in Massachusetts leading up to the Consumers decision
will then be discussed, with particular emphasis on the decision itself.
Next, an analysis will be made of the potential impact of the decision,
both on the competitive balance between savings banks and commercial
banks and on the traditional concepts of sound banking practice.
Finally, suggestions will be offered as to how best to deal with the prob-
lems occasioned by the institution of the NOW account.
I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF MUTUAL SAVINGS BANKS
From the establishment of the first two mutual savings banks in
1816, savings banks have filled the need of the less-than-affluent citizen
for a safe depository for his hard-earned savings. The working man
who saved at a mutual savings bank was not only confident that his
money was preserved in a reliable institution managed by men who
inspired public trust, but he also enjoyed the benefits of periodic divi-
dends, or interest, on his deposits.1°
From these early efforts to preserve and enhance the savings of the
average citizen there has grown a modern network of mutual savings
banks. There are currently nearly 500 mutuals with over 1,500 offices
in eighteen states," but their fundamental purpose remains the same:
Mutual savings banks are service institutions with two essen-
tial functions .... a responsibility to encourage habits of thrift
and provide convenient, safe facilities to care for the commu-
nity's savings .... [and] a responsibility to invest those funds
productively with maximum benefit to the community and
economy consistent with necessary liquidity and safety, as
well as a good return to their depositors."
The funds received as deposits in mutual savings banks have tradi-
tionally been channeled into areas of community development. In par-
ticular, nearly three-fourths of savings bank resources are invested in
residential mortgages." Among the other community facilities in which
savings banks hold mortgages are hospitals, shopping centers, religious
institutions, and nursing homes. In addition to extending credit in their
immediate communities, they have poured billions of dollars into mort-
gage programs in non-savings bank states."
IQ Swift, supra note 4, at 663.
11 These figures are as of December 31, 1970. Banking Profile, supra note 1, at 87.
12 J. Lintner, Mutual Savings Banks in the Savings and Mortgage Markets 211
(1948).
18 Swift, supra note 4, at 664.
14 Id. Swift provides a convenient summary of the nationwide impact of these
programs:
While oriented fundamentally to local community needs in the 18 states
where they exist, savings banks do place their excess funds in capital-shortage
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Since their inception, the record of mutual savings banks has been
one of stability, reliability, and public trust. Even during the depression
years of the 1930's, the savings bank industry continued to grow; few
of its institutions collapsed," while failures spawned by the economic
crisis were not uncommon among other types of deposit institutions."
It is not surprising, therefore, that financial historians have reflected
with admiration on the success of the savings bank industry:
Savings banks have generally succeeded in offering a rather
extraordinary degree of safety, . . . reflect[ing] credit on the
soundness of the organization of the system and its ability
to enlist the continuing interest and support of able, public-
spirited men as officers and trustees . . . . 17
II. THE LEGISLATIVE BACKGROUND: FEDERAL BANKING
LEGISLATION OF THE 1930's
Despite the strength of the savings bank industry, Congress was
forced to respond to the financial crisis brought on by the Depression.
Thus the 1930's saw the enactment of a great deal of federal banking
legislation. Many of the regulatory measures passed during those years
are still in force today in substantially the same form that they had
some forty years ago.
In actual fact, the wave of legislation began before the Depression,
when, in 1927, Congress passed the McFadden Act." Section 16 of
that Act amended section 24 of the Federal Reserve Act" to prohibit
national banks from exceeding the maximum interest rate payable on
savings deposits under state law:
Any [national bank] ... may continue hereafter as heretofore
areas throughout the nation. In some particularly fast growing non-savings bank
areas, savings banks have ... provided for more FHA-insured and VA-guaranteed
loans than have local commercial banks and savings and loan associations.
California, Texas and Florida residents have benefited especially from the
availability of mortgage credit from mutual savings banks. Our industry today
holds over $8 billion of mortgage loans in these three non-savings bank states.
Billions of dollars of savings bank mortgage credit have also been channeled into
. . . other non-savings bank states.
Reflecting the orientation of mutual savings banks to people and communi-
ties our industry has compiled a notable record in financing low- and middle-
income housing and community facilities. This record is evidenced, in part, by
the leading position of savings banks in FHA and VA mortgage programs, which
concentrate on financing the nation's middle-income families.
Id.
10 Id.
16 Between 1934 and 1940, a total of 448 banks, with deposits of $477 million, were
forced to close because of financial difficulties. These failures represent some 71% of the
625 bank closings between 1934 and 1970. Banking Profile, supra note 1, at 198.
17 Lintner, supra note 12, at 25.
18 Act of Feb. 25, 1927, ch. 191, 44 Stat. 1224 (codified in scattered sections of 12
U.S.C.).
18 Act of Dec. 23, 1913, ch. 6, If 24, 38 Stat. 273, as amended, 12 U.S.C. 11 371 (1970).
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to receive time and savings deposits and to pay interest on the
same, but the rate of interest which such association may pay
upon such time deposits or upon savings or other deposits
shall not exceed the maximum rate authorized by law to be
paid upon such deposits by State banks or trust companies
organized under the laws of the State in which such associa-
tion is located.'
During the 1920's, however, there had been no prohibition against
the payment of interest on demand deposits, although such a proposal
acquired widespread support. 21 The primary concern of those who ad-
vocated this proposal was that unbridled competitive interest rates
would lead to increased operating costs, forcing the banks to maintain
dangerously low reserve levels while engaging in speculative loans and
investments.'
The efforts of the opponents of interest payments on demand de-
posits reached fruition in 1933, when this type of banking practice was
made the subject of regulatory action under the Banking Act of 1933."
This Act, unquestionably motivated by the urgent need to stabilize the
banking industry amid the economic turbulence of the 1930's, sought
to impose direct federal regulation of interest rates on both time and
demand deposits. In pertinent part, it amended section 19 of the Fed-
eral Reserve Act' to provide that: "No member bank shall, directly or
indirectly, by any device whatsoever, pay any interest on any deposit
which is payable on demand . ."25 The 1933 Act also empowered the
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System to "prescribe rules
governing the payment and advertisement of interest on deposits, in-
cluding limitations on the rates of interest which may be paid by mem-
ber banks on time and savings deposits.""
The provisions of this amendment, originally enacted to apply only
to member banks of the Federal Reserve System, were extended by the
Banking Act of 1935 27 to cover all federally insured banks. In addition,
this Act gave the Federal Reserve Board broader powers to classify
20 12 U.S.C. § 371 (1970), formerly ch. 191, § 16, 44 Stat. 1233 (1927).
21 See authorities cited in Prochnow, Time Deposit Banking, 82 Banking L.J. 941,
943-44 no.6-11 (1965).
22 Id. at 944.
Studies of the monetary collapses of the early part of the century indicated that a
considerable volume of funds had flowed from interior banks to New York City
and other cities for speculative purposes. These funds [were] attracted by the
offer of interest payments on demand deposits . • ..
Id. (footnote omitted).
23 Act of June 16, 1933, ch. 89, 48 Stat. 162 (codified in scattered sections of 12
U.S.C.).
24 Act of Dec. 23, 1913, ch. 6, § 19, 38 Stat. 270, as amended, ch. 89, § 11(b), 48 Stat.
181 (1933).
25 12 U.S.C. § 371a (1970), formerly ch. 89, § 11(b), 48 Stat. 181 (1933).
20 12 U.S.C. § 371b (1970), formerly ch. 89, § 11(b), 48 Stat. 182 (1933).
27 Act of Aug. 23, 1935, ch. 614, § 101, 49 Stat. 702 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1828(g)
(1970)).
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deposits by type and to regulate the rates of interest paid on each type.
Under certain circumstances, such as those pertaining to deposits pay-
able outside the United States, limitations on interest payments were
not imposed at all."
A fourth major piece of federal banking legislation enacted during
this period was the Federal Deposit Insurance Act," which in 1933
authorized the creation of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
(FDIC). Perhaps more than any other enactment of Congress during
those troubled years, this Act was designed, through its use of deposit
insurance, to restore public confidence in banking institutions." The
Act required all banks organized under federal law to become insured
by the FDIC," and set forth the method by which state-chartered banks
could become insured if they so desired." Those state banks that did
become so insured automatically became subject to all rules and regu-
lations set down by the Board of Directors of the FDIC."
Thus, although mutual savings banks are always state-chartered,"
they may voluntarily become members of the Federal Reserve System"
or insured by the FDIC." If they elect either of these options they will
of course be subject to the applicable federal law. It appears, however—
as will be submitted below"—that federal law will prevent them from
offering the NOW account only if they elect to become member banks
of the Federal Reserve System.
III. CURRENT FEDERAL REGULATION OF BANK DEPOSITS
Congress has conferred upon the Board of Governors of the Fed-
eral Reserve System broad powers under which the Board may regulate
bank deposits. In addition to the authority to regulate the payment and
advertisement of interest on deposits," the Board is also given the
power:
28
 Act of Aug. 23, 1935, ch. 614, § 324(c), 49 Stat. 714 (codified at 12 U.S.C. H 371a,
b (1970)),
29
 The Federal Deposit Insurance Act was originally enacted as section 12B of the
Federal Reserve Act. Act of June 16, 1933, ch. 89, 1 8, 48 Stat. 168. In 1950 it was made
a separate act to be known as the Federal Deposit Insurance Act. Act of Sept. 21, 1950,
ch. 967, 64 Stat. 873 (codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1811 et seq. (1970)).
80 "Its obvious intent was, by insuring deposits, to prevent runs on banks by de-
positors, to preserve solvency of insured banks, and thus to keep open the channels of
trade and commercial exchange." Weir v. United States, 92 F.2d 634, 636 (7th Cir. 1937).
81
 Act of Sept. 21, 1950, ch. 967, § 2, 64 Stat. 875 (codified at 12 U.S.C.
	 1814(b)
(1970)).
82
 Act of Sept. 21, 1950, ch. 967, fl 2, 64 Stat. 876 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1815
(1970)).
88
 Weir v. United States, 92 F.2d 634, 637 (7th Cir. 1937) ; United States v. Doherty,
18 F. Supp. 793, 794-95 (D. Neb. 1937), aff'd, 94 F.2d 495 (8th Cir. 1938).
84 See note 2 supra.
85
 12 U.S.C. § 333 (1970).
Be 12 U.S.C. § 1815 (1970).
87 See text at notes 64-67 infra.
88
 12 U.S.C. § 371b (1970).
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to define ... terms used in . . . this title, to determine what shall
be deemed a payment of interest, to determine what . . . shall be
deemed a deposit, and to prescribe such regulations as it may
deem necessary to effectuate the purposes of such sections [of
this title] and to prevent evasions thereof."
It was under this authority that the Federal Reserve Board in 1933
issued Regulation Q," applicable to member banks of the Federal Re-
serve System.' It is within this regulation that the Board sets forth
its definitions and regulations concerning the classification of de-
posits," the payment of interest on deposits," and the manner of with-
drawal of savings deposits."
Regarding the classification of deposits, the Board has defined the
terms "time deposits," "savings deposits," and "demand deposits.'
The definitions relating to "time deposits," together with the footnotes
to them, indicate that where the bank specifically requires its depositor
to give written notice of at least thirty days before any withdrawal is
made, as opposed to merely reserving the right to require such notice,
the deposit will be classified as a "time deposit."'"
A "savings deposit," on the other band, is defined by Regulation
Q as a deposit
(1) Which consists of funds deposited to the credit of
one or more individuals, or of a corporation, association, or
other organization operated primarily for religious, philan-
thropic, charitable, educational, fraternal, or other similar
purposes and not operated for profit; or in which the entire
beneficial interest is held by one or more individuals or by
such a corporation, association, or other organization; and
(2) With respect to which the depositor is not required
by the deposit contract but may at any time be required by the
bank to give notice in writing of an intended withdrawal not
less than 30 days before such withdrawal is made, and which
is not payable on a specified date or at the expiration of a
specified time after the date of deposit. 47
In addition to reserving to the bank the right to impose a thirty-
day notice requirement on any withdrawal, the Federal Reserve Board
as 12 U.S.C. § 461(a) (1970).
40 12 C.F.R. §§ 217.0-.7 (1972).
41
 Id. at § 217.0(b).
42 Id. at * 217.1.
43
 Id. at §§ 217.2, .3, .7.
44 Id. at	 217.5.
43 Id. at § 217.1.
46
 Id. at § 217.1(b)-(d) & nn.1, 3. Since the terms of the notice requirement clearly
exclude the NOW account from classification as a "time deposit," a description of the
other elements of a "time deposit" is not useful to this discussion.
47 Id. at § 217.1(e) (footnotes omitted).
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has also restricted the manner in which savings deposits may be with-
drawn: '
(c) Manner of payment of savings deposits. (1) Subject
to the rn provisions of subparagraph (2) of this paragraph, a
member bank may permit withdrawals to be made from a sav-
ings deposit only through payment to the depositor himself
(but not to any other person whether or not acting for the
depositor) . . .48
Exceptions to this provision permit savings withdrawals to be paid
to individuals other than the depositor in the following cases only: to
a person presenting the passbook; to a fiduciary; to a person who has
extended credit secured by the savings deposit; pursuant to a court
order; upon the death of the depositor; or upon written instructions to
pay interest.'"
While this provision of Regulation Q does not address itself di-
rectly to the problems raised by the NOW account, it is submitted that
its requirement that savings withdrawals be paid only to the depositor
himself would effectively prevent the use of negotiable withdrawal orders
payable to third parties as a valid method of withdrawing funds from
savings accounts. 60
 In this regard, the Federal Reserve Board has indi-
cated to member banks that accounts—at least those classified as "sav-
ings" accounts—would not be permitted to offer third-party payment
services through the use of negotiable drafts drawn by a depositor. This
would be so, regardless of whether the deposit agreement contains a
specific "30 day written notice of withdrawal" provision or whether such
a requirement is merely reserved to the bank."
The third term, "demand deposits," is defined by Regulation Q
as follows:
(a) Demand Deposits. The term "any deposit which is
payable on demand", hereinafter referred to as a "demand de-
posit", includes every deposit which is not a "time deposit" or
"savings deposit", as defined in this section."
No provision is made in Regulation Q relating to the manner of
withdrawal of demand deposits; as is done in the case of savings deposit
withdrawals. However, another provision, applicable solely to demand
deposits, declares that "no member bank of the Federal Reserve System
shall, directly or indirectly, by any device whatsoever, pay any interest
on any demand deposit." a $ This latter provision of Regulation Q is
48 Id. at § 217.5(c)(1) (footnote omitted).
49 Id. at § 217.5(c)(1)(i)-(vi).
80
 This conclusion relies on the premise that NOW account deposits are categorized
as savings deposits, and not as demand deposits. For an analysis of this problem, see text
at notes 92-94 infra.
61 12 C.F.R. § 204.105 (1972).
as Id. at § 217.1(a).
153 Id. at { 217.2(a).
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essentially the same as the interest prohibition in section 19 of the
Federal Reserve Act." As was stated earlier," the reason for the
prohibition against interest payments on demand deposits sterns from
the dangers that would arise if banks were permitted to compete for
demand deposits by offering high rates of interest. The increased
costs of maintaining the deposits, as well as the substantial amounts of
interest to be paid, might keep reserve levels too low to accommodate
unexpected rises in the numbers and amounts of withdrawals. Since by
the very nature of demand deposits banks are obligated to pay them on
demand, the purpose to be served by the prohibition of interest pay-
ments is the reduction of risk to both banks and depositors in the event
of a sudden run on the bank.
As a result of the prohibition against interest payments on demand
deposits, it is apparent that if the NOW account were to be classified as
a true checking account—in other words, as a demand deposit account
—then, despite its "savings account" label, the payment of interest
would be prohibited under Regulation Q. It is doubtful that the NOW
account could be so classified." However, that question appears aca-
demic, since, as has already been shown, if the NOW account is classi-
fied as a savings account it is violative of the prohibition against pay-
ment of withdrawals to third persons. On that ground alone, then, it
appears likely that the NOW account will be held invalid should a
member bank of the Federal Reserve System introduce it.
In a further effort to promote the safety of bank deposits, Congress
has required all member banks of the Federal Reserve System to main-
tain reserves against deposits; the minimum levels of such reserves are
to be determined by the Federal Reserve Board, within certain limita-
tions set by Congress." It is notable that the minimum reserve ratios
for time and savings deposits are substantially lower than the ratio ap-
plicable to demand deposits." This disparity evidently stems from the
greater susceptibility of demand deposits to instantaneous withdrawals.
While the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System is
empowered to regulate the classification, withdrawal, and payment of
interest only on deposits of member banks, authority has been granted
to the Board of Directors of the FDIC to regulate deposits of all banks
that are FDIC-insured and are not members of the Federal Reserve
System. The enabling legislation provides that:
The Board of Directors shall by regulation prohibit the
payment of interest or dividends on demand deposits in in-
sured nonmember banks and for such purpose it may definite
154 See text at note 25 supra.
55 See text at note 22 supra.
55 See text at notes 92-94 infra.
57 12	 § 461(6) (1970).
55 According to the Federal Reserve Board's Regulation D, the current applicable
reserve requirements are 3% of a member bank's savings deposits, 3-5% of its time
deposits, and either 12%43% (for banks not in a reserve city) or 17-17%% (for reserve
city banks) of its demand deposits. 12 C.F.R. § 204.5(a) (1972).
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[sic] the term "demand deposits" . . . . The Board of Direc-
tors may from time to time . . . prescribe rules governing the
payment and advertisement of interest on deposits, including
limitations on the rates of interest or dividends that may be
paid by insured nonmember banks (including insured mutual
savings banks) on time and savings deposits . . . . The Board
of Directors is authorized . . . to define the terms "time de-
posits" and "savings deposits", to determine what shall be
deemed a payment of interest, and to prescribe such regula-
tions as it may deem necessary to effectuate the purposes of
this subsection and to prevent evasions thereof."
Under this authority the FDIC Board has promulgated regula-
tions essentially the same as those contained in Regulation Q." In par-
ticular, (1) the FDIC's definitions of "time deposits," "savings de-
posits," and "demand deposits" are essentially the same as those of the
Federal Reserve Board;" (2) the payment of interest on demand de-
posits by FDIC-insured banks is prohibited;" and (3) withdrawals
from savings deposits in FDIC-insured banks may be made only to the
depositor himself and not to a third party, except in certain specified
cases."
However, notwithstanding the many similarities between Regula-
tion Q and its parallel FDIC regulation, the latter is limited in scope
by the following clause:
Except as provided in §§ 329.7 and 329.8 the provisions of
this part do not apply to mutual savings banks or to guaranty
savings banks operating in the State of New Hampshire so
long as said guaranty savings banks operate substantially
under and pursuant to the laws of the State of New Hamp-
shire pertaining to mutual savings banks and do not engage
in commercial banking."
It is submitted that this provision must be read as exempting
mutual savings banks generally from the FDIC equivalent of Regula-
tion Q. Although the regulatory language is admittedly unclear as to
whether the stated exemption applies only to mutual savings banks and
guaranty savings banks in New Hampshire, or whether it includes all
mutual savings banks everywhere—that is, whether the limiting phrase
69
 12 U.S.C. § 1828(g) (1970).
eo 12 C.F.R. § 329.0-.10 (1972).
61 Compare id. at § 329.1 with id. at § 217.1. The only substantive differences in
these sections pertain to time certificates of deposit and to promissory notes and other
obligations, neither of which is relevant to this discussion.
62 Id. at § 329.2(a); compare id. § 217.2(a).
06 Id. at § 329.5(c); compare id. 	 217.5(c).
64
 Id. at § 329.0. Section 329.7 prescribes maximum rates of interest for mutual
savings banks. Section 329.8 regulates the advertising of interest on deposits.
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"operating in the State of New Hampshire" applies to the words "mu-
tual savings banks or to guaranty savings banks," or simply to the
words "guaranty savings banks"—this comment adopts the latter in-
terpretation as the more plausible. Convincing support for the latter
interpretation is afforded by the fact that the Petition for Relief filed
in response to the Consumers decision by the commercial bankers of
Massachusetts and New Hampshire adopts arguendo the same inter-
pretation." Since this interpretation is clearly against the interests of
the Massachusetts commercial banks, it is doubtful that the drafters
of the Petition felt that the alternative interpretation, which would re-
strict the application of the clause to New Hampshire, could be main-
tained.
It appears, then, that the stated exemption removes mutual savings
banks that are FDIC-insured from application of the prohibition
against interest payments on demand deposits and the restriction
against payment of savings deposit withdrawals to third parties."
Hence mutual savings banks will be subject to the prohibition against
interest payments and the withdrawal restrictions only if they are mem-
bers of the Federal Reserve System. It is this exemption provision that
makes the Consumers decision so important; without it the NOW ac-
count would be merely an oddity resulting from the unique Massachu-
65 Massachusetts Bankers Association and New Hampshire Bankers Association,
Petition for Relief with Respect to Third Party Withdrawal Orders Offered by Mutual
Savings Banks, at 15 (Oct. 20, 1972) thereinafter cited as Petition for Relief].
66 It should be noted that savings and loan associations are subject to both restric-
tions, Under enabling legislation similar to the statutes conferring regulatory authority
upon the Federal Reserve Board and the FDIC Board, the Federal Home Loan Bank
Board (FHLBB) has been granted regulatory powers relating to savings and loan asso-
ciations. 12 U.S.C. § 1461 et seq. (1970). In addition to providing for the "organization,
incorporation, examination, operation, and regulation of . . . 'Federal Savings and Loan
Associations,' " 12 U.S.C. § 1464(a) (1970), Congress has provided that:
Except as may be otherwise authorized ... the payment of any savings account
shall be subject to the right of the association to require such advance notice,
not less than thirty days, as shall be provided for by the charter of the association
or the regulations of the Board . . . . Savings accounts shall not be subject to
check or to withdrawal or transfer on negotiable or transferable order or autho-
rization to the association, but the Board may by regulation provide for with-
drawal or transfer of savings accounts upon nontransferable order or authorization.
12 U.S.C. § 1464(b) (1) (1970).
Under this authority, the FHLBB has issued regulations effectively prohibiting the
institution of third-party payment accounts in all federal savings and loan associations.
12 C.F.R. § 545.4-1(a) (1972).
The impact of the NOW account on the savings and loan industry is treated in
Negotiable Withdrawal Orders Legal for Massachusetts Savings Banks, 38 Legal Bulletin—
The Law Affecting Savings Associations 384 (1972). It is stated therein that thirteen
states currently permit state-chartered savings and loan associations to make limited
third-party payment transfers, but that "federal savings associations, as well as most state-
chartered associations [in nine of the thirteen states], can use only nonnegotiable and non-
transferable payment orders." Id. at 386. The conclusion is drawn that "[u]nder the
present Iaw and regulations savings associations do not have the power to compete
effectively with the Massachusetts savings bank plan . . . ," Id, at 387.
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setts savings bank insurance system that permits most Massachusetts
savings banks to forego FDIC insurance." With it, however, the NOW
account becomes a potential banking practice in every state in which
non-Federal-Reserve-member mutual savings banks are not subject to
state laws comparable to Regulation Q.
IV. THE Consumers DECISION
The preceding sections of this comment have advanced the con-
tention that a mutual savings bank which is not a member of the Fed-
eral Reserve System, even though it is FDIC-insured, is not precluded
by federal law from offering the NOW account to its depositors. The
only limitation upon such a bank would have to be found in state law.
Although a survey of the banking laws of the various states is beyond
the scope of this comment, it will be instructive to examine briefly the
Consumers decision, since it is the only case to date which has dealt
with the legality of the NOW account under state law.
In order to place Consumers in proper perspective, the unique regu-
latory scheme in Massachusetts will first be discussed, followed by a
treatment of the opinion of the Supreme Judicial Court.
A. The Regulatory Scheme in Massachusetts
It would not be improper to say that mutual savings banks in Mas-
sachusetts enjoy a freedom from federal regulation unknown in other
states. This freedom arises from the fact that except for eight FDIC-
insured savings banks, Massachusetts mutuals are neither member
banks of the Federal Reserve System nor insured by the FDIC." While
Massachusetts savings banks may apply for Federal Reserve member-
ship" and FDIC insurance," very few have chosen to do so, preferring
to utilize instead an advantage unique to Massachusetts: a state-orga-
nized deposit insurance fund for mutual savings banks.
The Massachusetts regulatory scheme dates back to the creation
of the FDIC in 1933. At that time, the Massachusetts Commissioner of
Banks reported: "The privilege of participation [in the FDIC] was
also extended to mutual savings banks, but no Massachusetts savings
bank has applied for admission because of the excessive expense and
because the provisions of the plan do not appear adaptable to savings
banks."71
Although there were practical dollars-and-cents reasons for the
reluctance of savings banks to become federally insured, 72
 the decision
67 See discussion in text at notes 78-82 infra.
68 Petition for Relief, supra note 65, at 17.
09 12 U.S.C. § 321 (1970).
70 12 U.S.C. § 1815 (1970).
71 1933 Mass. Comm'r of Banks Ann. Rep., pt. 1, at Li.
72 A 1933 commission study showed that during the 115 years preceding the first
two temporary bank closings in February 1932, the total losses, after liquidation, of
mutual savings banks in Massachusetts amounted to only $2,549,868. The commission
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of the Massachusetts mutuals to decline the FDIC's program was based
as well upon a desire to diminish the effects of federal regulation on
state-chartered banks. This desire is reflected in further comments by
the Commissioner at that time:
This is apparently, by indirection, the beginning of the
unification of the banking system of the country and its super-
vision by Federal authorities. . . . Any general expansion of
this procedure will, in effect, supersede state authority over
all banks which are members of the Federal Reserve System
or of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation."
In order to avoid greater federal intrusion into the regulation of state-
chartered banks, the Massachusetts legislature undertook to create its
own deposit insurance fund. A special commission was established and
charged with devising a means for the protection of deposits in state-
chartered banks 74—in effect, an alternative to the FDIC. The commis-
sion's study concluded that the Massachusetts mutual savings banks
were too strong to be subject to the federal assessment." More impor-
tantly, the commission concluded, the FDIC was created without regard
to the needs or conditions of mutual savings banks. Such banks, they
felt, were included merely as an afterthought." Accordingly, the com-
mission recommended that it would not be in the best interests of the
mutual savings banks of Massachusetts to have their deposits federally
insured."
Consequently, in 1932, the Massachusetts legislature established
the Mutual Savings Central Fund, Inc. (MSCF)." The assets of the
MSCF, obtained by periodic assessments imposed upon member banks
and by legislatively prescribed investments, are divided into two funds
—the Liquidity Fund, to aid member banks in need of cash, and the
Deposit Insurance Fund," created in 1934, which, as its name implies,
protects the depositors' money in a fashion similar to that of the
FDIC.8° Under current state law, all savings banks in Massachusetts
noted that membership in the FDIC program, which at the time offered temporary six-
month insurance protection, required each insured bank to be assessed one percent of its
total deposits not exceeding $2,500. The total assessment of all Massachusetts mutuals
would be roughly $14,000,000. If they entered the FDIC program, the commission con-
cluded, the savings banks would be assuming a liability nearly six times as great as their
entire loss to depositors over the 115-year period—and this for only six months' worth
of insurance coverage! Report of the Special Commission for Investigation and Study of
the Banking Structure, Mass. Sen. Doc. No. 100, at 23-24 (1934) [hereinafter cited as
Banking Structure Report].
78 1933 Mass. Comm'r of Banks Ann. Rep., pt. 1, at
74 Banking Structure Report, supra note 72, at 5.
75 See note 72 supra.
76 Banking Structure Report, supra note 72, at 24.
77 Id. at 25-26.
78 See Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 168 App., §§ 1-I et seq. (1971).
70 See Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 168 App., § 1-1 (1971).
80 Compare 12 U.S.C. §§ 1821-23 (1970) with Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 168 App.,
§§ 2-3A to 2-6 (1971).
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are automatically subject to membership in the MSCF, 8' although pro-
cedures are specified by which a savings bank may choose instead to
become insured by the FDIC."
Thus, with the exception of eight FDIC-insured mutual savings
banks, Massachusetts savings banks are subject neither to Regulation
Q nor to its parallel FDIC regulation. The eight FDIC-insured banks
are subject to the FDIC regulation, but because of their status as
mutual savings banks are apparently exempted, by operation of the
exemption discussed above, from the savings deposit withdrawal re-
strictions and the demand deposit interest prohibition.' Consequently,
regardless of which Massachusetts savings bank first presented the
NOW account question for judicial examination, the Supreme Judicial
Court of Massachusetts was limited to an examination of applicable
state law.
B. The Court's Opinion
On July 28, 1970, the Consumers Savings Bank of Worcester
(Consumers) transmitted to the Massachusetts Commissioner of Banks
a plan for the transfer of funds from savings accounts through the use
of negotiable withdrawal orders. Except for the feature of negotiability,
these withdrawal orders were to be no different from the ones currently
in use by Consumers in their standard savings accounts. To insure that
these new accounts would continue to be classified as savings accounts,
each depositor would be required to sign an agreement setting forth the
rules of operation of the new withdrawal orders, such agreement to in-
clude the provision that their withdrawals are subject to statutory notice
requirements."
On September 28, 1970, the Commissioner wrote Consumers, stat-
ing her opinion that the use of such withdrawal orders, unaccompanied
by passbooks, would be impermissible under Massachusetts law."
Following the Commissioner's rejection of the plan, Consumers
filed a bill in equity for declaratory relief, seeking a judicial determina-
81 See Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 168 App, § 1-1 (1971).
82 See Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 168 App., § 2-12, -13 (1971).
88 See text at notes 64-67 supra.
m Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 168, §f 26(2)-(3) (1971) provides:
2. Ninety Day Notice.—The treasurer or other authorized officer of such
corporation [a savings bank] may at any time require a depositor to give a
written notice of his intention to withdraw the whole or any part of his deposit
. such notice to be for a period not exceeding ninety days. .. .
3. Six Months' Notice.—Whenever • .. there is an unusual demand for
withdrawals the corporation may with the approval of the commissioner, and
whenever in the opinion of the commissioner there is such an unusual demand
the corporation shall upon his order, require a depositor to give written notice
of his intention to withdraw the whole or any part of his deposit ... such notice
to be for such period, not exceeding six months, as may be determined by the
commissioner, which period may in his discretion be extended, but not beyond
one year from the date of such notice ....
85 Id. Brief for Petitioner at 3, Consumers Savings Bank v. Commissioner of Banks,
— Mass. —, 282 N.E.2d 416 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Brief for Petitioner].
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tion that a mutual savings bank has the authority, under Massachusetts
law, to arrange for the transfer of savings account funds via negotiable
withdrawal orders." The case was reported without decision by the
SO The problem faced by the Consumers court was in some respects not a new one.
The question of the authority of mutual savings banks to offer checking accounts bad
already been the subject of judicial decisions in three states. As a result of these decisions,
mutual savings banks in Maryland and New Jersey are now permitted to maintain non-
interest-bearing checking accounts. Savings Bank v. Bank Comm'r, 248 Md. 461, 237 A.2d
45 (1968); Hudson County Nat'l Bank v. Provident Inst. for Savings, 80 N.J. Super. 339,
193 A.2d 697 (Super. Ct., Ch. Div. 1963), aff'd per curiam, 44 N.J. 282, 208 A.2d 409
(1965). Compare Androscoggin County Savings Bank v. Campbell, 282 A.2d 858 (Me.
1971). It should be noted at the outset, however, that the New Jersey court classified
the accounts as demand deposit accounts and that the Maryland case dealt with an
account wherein the bank retained its right to require advance notice of withdrawal.
Furthermore, in neither case did the bank pay interest on the account in question.
In Hudson County, the court upheld the right of New Jersey mutual savings banks
to offer non-interest-bearing checking accounts on the basis of a state statute granting
the authority "to receive money on deposit ... according to the usual custom of savings
banks." N.J. Stat. Ann. § 17:9A-26(1) (1963). The court noted that it had been the
practice of a substantial number (but not a majority) of the state's savings banks to
maintain demand deposit accounts, a practice dating back at least thirty years prior to
the institution of this suit. This practice was known to both the Legislature and the
Commissioner of Banking and Insurance, neither of whom took steps to curtail it. Conse-
quently, the court concluded, the "usual custom of savings banks" included the authority
to accept demand deposits subject to withdrawal by check. 80 N.J. Super. at 356, 193
A.2d at 706.
A similar fact situation existed in Savings Bank, in which the authority of mutual
savings banks in Maryland to provide checking accounts was upheld. Under a statute
similar to the one upon which the Consumers court based its opinion, see note 90 infra,
the Maryland court found that the manner of withdrawal of savings bank deposits is
left to the bylaws of each bank, and is not prescribed by statute. 248 Md. at 471-72,
237 A.2d at 50-51. Compare Md. Ann. Code art. 11, § 41(a) (1968) with Mass. Ann.
Laws ch. 168, § 26 (1971). The bylaws in question specifically authorized the receiving
of deposits in checking accounts, under the provisions that: (1) no interest be paid on
any checking account, and (2) the bank may require thirty days notice of intent to
withdraw. While upholding the bank's right to continue to maintain checking accounts,
the court specifically ruled that the notice requirement "negates the assumption that
deposits made in accounts subject to withdrawal by check can be characterized as demand
deposits." 248 Md. at 475, 237 A.2d at 53. The sole restriction imposed by the court upon
the authority granted, other than those already contained in the bank's bylaws, was that
the funds deposited in the checking accounts be invested or loaned out according to
state law. 248 Md. at 472-73, 237 A.2d at 51. The Maryland court, using language later
quoted in Consumers, — Mass. at —, 282 N.E.2d at 417, concluded that the use of checks
for the withdrawal of funds would not change the characterization of the funds from
savings deposits to demand deposits:
If . . . a depositor of the Bank, on making a withdrawal, has the option of
requesting cash, or a treasurer's check, or of purchasing a money order, . . .
according him a fourth option of drawing a check on his own account .. is a
distinction without a difference.
248 Md. at 475, 237 A.2d at 53.
But see Androscoggin, in which the Maine court held that savings banks were not
authorized by statute to offer checking accounts. The court distinguished both Hudson
County and Savings Bank on the ground that, unlike those in New Jersey and Maryland,
mutual savings banks in Maine had never before offered checking services to any customer,
nor had any tacit consent ever been given in this regard by any state banking authority.
282 A.2d at 863-65.
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Superior Court to the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts for its
determination. The high court, in a brief opinion, held that the bank
was entitled to go ahead with its plan in the case stated."
The court apparently rejected the respondent's contention" that
the NOW account was, in effect, a demand deposit account." The
court then proceeded to note that the relevant state statutes prescribed
the types and conditions of permitted accounts, but did not prescribe
withdrawal procedures. Rather, formulation of such procedures was left
to the individual banks, subject to the statutory notice requirement."
Accordingly, the court held, Consumers' bylaw permitting withdrawals
"by presentation of deposit book, other evidence of deposit or other
written instrument, by the depositor, his legally appointed representa-
tive or another on written order" was not prohibited by state law, and
by its terms authorized withdrawal by negotiable order ° 1
Although the Consumers court failed to analyze in depth the argu-
ment that the NOW account represents maintenance of a demand de-
posit account by a savings bank, and is thereby prohibited by state
banking statutes, it is submitted that this classification question is cru-
cial to the court's holding, which rests upon the premise that the NOW
account is a savings account. Hence an examination of the soundness
of that premise appears in order.
While the NOW account operates very nearly as does a traditional
checking account, it is, strictly speaking, not a checking account, be-
cause the bank retains the statutory authority to impose upon the de-
positor a requirement of ninety days written notice of intent to with-
draw." Therefore—theoretically at least—the deposits are not demand
deposits.
In practice, however, it is clear that NOW account withdrawal
orders will be paid on demand, just as regular savings account with-
drawals are traditionally paid on demand. In fact, rarely during the
In addition to the Maryland and New Jersey precedents, Indiana savings banks have
maintained checking accounts since their founding. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 85,
at 22. "The savings bank statutes in Indiana are substantially similar to those in Massa-
chusetts and contain no express provision allowing deposits to be subject to negotiable
order." Id. However, they are still permitted to offer demand deposit accounts.
87 Consumers Savings Bank v. Commissioner of Banks, — Mass. —, 282 N.E.2d 416,
417-18 (1972).
88 Brief for Respondent at 6-7, Consumers Savings Bank v. Commissioner of Banks,
— Mass. —, 282 N.E.2d 416 (1972).
89 Although never expressly referring to the Commissioner's argument that the NOW
account represented the initiation of demand deposit accounts by savings banks, the court
did state that "We do not agree with the commissioner that use of the negotiable with-
drawal order creates a new account not authorized by [the state banking statutes]." —
Mass, —, 282 N.E.2d at 417. Furthermore, throughout its opinion the court referred to
the issue at hand as being that of the validity of this method of withdrawal from a
depositor's savings account.
99 Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 168, § 26 (1971) provides in part that deposits "may be
withdrawn at such time and in such manner as the by-laws direct , 	 ."
91 - Mass, at —, 282 N.E.2d at 417.
92 See Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 168, { 26(2) (1971), quoted in note 84 supra.
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long history of the savings bank industry in Massachusetts has the
ninety-day notice requirement been imposed, and in the case of Con-
sumers it has never been operative." Nevertheless, what is crucial to
classification as a savings deposit is the authority of a bank to impose
a requirement of written notice of intent to withdraw, and not the actual
imposition of the notice requirement. Thus, although NOW account
withdrawal orders are, for all intents and purposes, payable on demand,
the funds in the account retain their identity as savings deposits. Were
the test otherwise—one that inquired whether or not a notice require-
ment was actually imposed—then even a regular savings account would
be deemed a demand deposit account, since in practice savings with-
drawals are paid on demand.
Alternatively, the crucial factor in classifying an account as a de-
mand deposit account is "not ... whether checks may be drawn against
it, but . . . whether the unconditional right to withdraw exists.”" In a
regular checking account, the drawee bank is obligated to honor all
checks properly drawn by the depositor against sufficient balances. The
NOW account's notice requirement, however, is a condition potentially
affecting the right of the depositor to withdraw. Thus, from a technical
definitional standpoint, the NOW account is not a checking account at
all, but rather a savings account, and the position of the Consumers
court on the classification issue, and hence its decision on the ultimate
issue of the legality of the NOW account, appear well-founded.
Despite the technical precision of the Consumers court's response,
there are important considerations of competition and sound banking
practice to which the court did not address itself and in light of which
the decision should be considered. In holding that Massachusetts mutual
savings banks may permit their depositors to make withdrawals by
means of negotiable withdrawal orders, the court has in effect permitted
the introduction into savings banks of interest-bearing third-party pay-
ment accounts. In theory, the decision has merely authorized the imple-
mentation of a new method of savings withdrawal, but its practical effect
has sparked the ire of commercial bankers, who see the Consumers
decision as the means by which savings banks may invade an area long
the exclusive domain of commercial banks.
V. THE IMPACT OF THE NOW ACCOUNT ON THE
BANKING INDUSTRY
As a result of the Consumers decision, Massachusetts mutual sav-
ings banks may now compete with commercial banks in the area of
third-party payment accounts. The decision authorizes the implementa-
tion of a new device which, at the very least, is potentially capable of
giving to savings banks a substantial competitive advantage in a state
as Brief for Petitioner, supra note 85, at 15.
04 Koplow, Massachusetts Legal Decision Confuses Savings Bank Status, American
Banker, Sept. 25, 1972, at 17, col. 1.
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which already may well have the strongest savings bank industry in the
United States." At its worst, "[t]he entry of savings banks into the
checking account business is potentially disastrous for commercial
banks in the commonwealth."" Whether this statement exaggerates the
potential effect of the NOW account on the future of banking in Mas-
sachusetts and across the nation is, of course, not yet known. Neverthe-
less, the Consumers decision and the resulting implementation of NOW
accounts have come under recent attack by the commercial banks of
Massachusetts and New Hampshire. 97 The commercial banks have
launched what is basically a two-pronged attack. First, they emphasize
the traditional balance of power that has long existed between com-
mercial banks and savings banks, and express the fear that the addi-
tional powers recently granted to savings banks, of which the NOW
account is.but one, will upset the balance in favor of the savings banks.
Secondly, they stress the failure of the Consumers court to consider the
potentially dangerous effect of the NOW account on traditional concepts
of sound banking practice.
A. Impact on the Competitive Balance
The legislative and regulatory background relating to bank de-
posits is indicative of the validity of the statement by the Massachusetts
Commissioner of Banks that:
There is a delicate balance of power between commercial
banks and thrift institutions. Different statutory and regulatory
provisions over the years, at both the state and Federal level,
have been designed to maintain this equilibrium, in the interest
of the banks, and, ultimately, of the public. Every expansion
of the powers of one segment of the banking industry must
have an adverse effect on other types of institutions unless
some accommodation is made to extend their powers as well."
It is evident from the long and successful history of the savings
bank industry that that type of institution is worth preserving, particu-
larly in regard to its principal functions of serving the savings and mort-
gage markets. Just as surely, no one can dispute the need for commercial
banks to serve the commercial borrower and the corporate depositor,
who require a higher degree of bank liquidity than do the savings cus-
tomer and the long-term mortgage borrower. Both types of institutions
95 According to the Massachusetts Commissioner of Banks: "Massachusetts is, very
possibly, the only state in which savings bank assets exceed those of commercial banks."
Id. at 27, col. 1.
98 Id. at 17, col. 4.
97 See Petition for Relief, supra note 65. The commercial banks of New Hampshire
have joined in the fight because of the recent introduction of NOW accounts into that
state by the New Hampshire Savings Bank in Manchester. See Boston Sunday Globe, Feb.
11, 1973, at 63, col. 5; American Banker, Sept. 18, 1972, at 2, col. 3.
98 Koplow, supra note 94, at 17, col. 4.
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serve useful ends, and to increase the profitability of one at the expense
of the other would tend, if proper controls were not exercised, to frus-
trate these ends.
The difficulty in fashioning such controls arises from the current
uncertainty regarding what customer reaction to the NOW account will
be, and how that reaction, in combination with other new trends in
banking, will affect the position of the savings banks vis-à-vis commer-
cial banks. Were the NOW account, for example, not so potentially at-
tractive to typical consumers, including those who now utilize checking
accounts in commercial banks, the commercial banks might feel less
threatened than in the existing situation, in which customers of the 29
savings banks now offering this service in Massachusetts have already
opened some 12,000 NOW accounts with an estimated aggregate bal-
ance of $15,000,000." The commercial banks apparently foresee the
likelihood of their customers being "lured" to the savings banks by
these attractive new services. On the other hand, the savings banks
contend that they are not attempting to upset the competitive balance,
but are merely trying to provide their own customers with a service
they desire to have. 1°°
Despite the substantial funds deposited in NOW accounts during
the first few months of their operation, it appears doubtful that the
NOW account alone will cause much of a drain on commercial bank
customers. In the first place, as implemented by the Consumers Sav-
ings Bank, NOW accounts are presently offered only to individual de-
positors and not to business or corporate customers. Since corporate,
rather than personal, checking accounts are the mainstay of the com-
mercial banks' deposit business, the NOW accounts would present
relatively little competition in this area. Furthermore, under the current
setup of the NOW accounts, even an individual depositor has little to
gain by transferring his money from a commercial bank checking ac-
count into a savings bank NOW account, since the standard charge of
fifteen cents per withdrawal order serves to diminish the dividends
earned by his deposits. Unless the, depositor maintains large balances
and writes few withdrawal orders, he could actually end up losing
money instead of earning it.'"
Whether or not the institution of third-party payment accounts
of the type recently implemented in Massachusetts would in itself con-
99 Petition for Relief, supra note 65, at 23. A more recent report states that "[Once
[NOW accounts] were first offered, they have generated 17,000 new accounts and deposits
of $30 million in New England. More depositors are signing up at the rate of 100 a day."
Time, Jan. 15, 1973, at 71. Another recent report indicates that the number of Massachu-
setts mutual savings banks offering NOW accounts has increased to between 50 and 5.5. See
Boston Sunday Globe, Feb. 11, 1973, at 63, col. 2.
100 Reply Brief for Petitioner at 19-20, Consumers Savings Bank v. Commissioner of
Banks, — Mass. —, 282 N.E.2d 416 (1972).
101 However, there appear to be no legal requirements preventing the savings banks
from dropping or limiting the fifteen-cent charge, in a manner similar to the "no charge"
or "minimum balance" checking accounts available at many commercial banks.
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stitute a threat to the traditional role of commercial banking, the real
impact of these accounts can best be determined by viewing them in
the context of other recent developments in banking. Recent years have
seen, on the one hand, the growth of savings deposits in commercial
banks and the development of "full-service" or "one-stop" banking,
and, on the other hand, the expansion of savings banks in some states
into the checking account and credit card business. Each of these de-
velopments adds a weight to the competitive scale, and it is only when
all the weights are added together that it is possible to see which way the
scale tips.
The last decade has seen a tremendous increase in the amount of
savings deposits in commercial banks. In fact, the recent report of the
President's Commission on Financial Structure and Regulation (com-
monly known as the Hunt Commission) has indicated that during the
1960's, time and savings deposits in all insured commercial banks in
the United States increased more than threefold, from 73.3 billion dol-
lars in 1960 to 233.0 billion dollars in 1970. 102
 No doubt this increase
is due largely to the popular concept of "full-service" banking. Many
customers consider the convenience of being able to transact all their
banking business at one bank more important than the extra interest
their savings deposits would earn at a savings bank, and are willing to
take the "loss" of interest for the added convenience of "one-stop" bank-
ing. In states permitting savings bank checking accounts, however, the
convenience of one-stop banking would be realized as well at a savings
bank as at a commercial bank, with no corresponding loss of interest.
Moreover, the Massachusetts NOW account permits the consumer to
enjoy an even greater convenience—a single account combining the
best features of both a savings account and a checking account. Ac-
cordingly, the granting of authority to savings banks to offer third-party
payment accounts will apparently put a damper on the one-stop banking
concept that has been a prime drawing attraction of commercial banks.
While the "convenience" argument drawn above would be appli-
cable in any state adopting savings bank "checking accounts," there
are several factors unique to Massachusetts that bear on the competi-
tive balance between commercial banks and savings banks. Of funda-
mental importance in this regard is the MSCF. Under the statutory
provisions relating to the MSCF, all deposits in Massachusetts savings
banks are insured in full, up to the limit of $40,000 per depositor."'
This is twice the maximum amount of insurance coverage provided
by the FDIC to each depositor.'" In fact, in the case of the eight
102 Report of the President's Commission on Financial Structure & Regulation 140-41
(1971) [hereinafter cited as Hunt Commission].
1" Mass. Ann. Laws ch, 168, §§ 21, 22 (1971) permit an individual or joint account
holder to deposit up to $40,000 in a Massachusetts savings bank. Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 168
App., § 2-1 (1971) established a fund under the MSCF "for the insurance of deposits in all
savings banks established under the laws of the commonwealth." Id.
104 12 U.S.C. § 1821(a) (1970). "The maximum amount of the insured deposit of
any depositor shall be $20,000." Id. See 12 C.F.R. §§ 330.1-.10 (1972).
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FDIC-insured Massachusetts savings banks, the MSCF even provides
insurance coverage for all deposits in excess of the FDIC's $20,000
limit ."5
 Since there is no state insurance fund in Massachusetts that
protects commercial bank deposits, their coverage is limited to the
FDIC maximum of $20,000. 10° For this reason, depositors maintaining
balances in excess of $20,000 will be fully insured in a Massachusetts
mutual savings bank, but not in a commercial bank.
In addition to the extended deposit insurance coverage, Massachu-
setts savings banks have recently benefited by the enactment of legisla-
tion authorizing them to issue credit cards.'" As in the case of checking
accounts, credit cards have traditionally been part of the exclusive pre-
serve of the commercial banks, and in light of the increasing popularity
of credit cards, it is likely that this additional power conferred upon
savings banks will serve as an attraction to consumers.
In view of all these considerations, the total impact of the broaden-
ing of the powers of Massachusetts savings banks appears to weigh
heavily in favor of the savings banks. As the picture stands now, the
typical Massachusetts customer can transact all his banking business
at a savings bank—savings account (with higher interest rates than
are paid at commercial banks), "checking" services (the NOW ac-
count), credit card (recently granted to savings banks), and personal
and mortgage borrowing. Furthermore, not only have savings banks been
afforded new privileges, but they have been given them without any
corresponding relinquishment of the traditional benefits enjoyed exclu-
sively by savings banks. Moreover, it must be stressed that the benefits
conferred upon savings banks are by no means unique to Massachu-
setts. They vary from state to state, but in many respects they have
placed savings banks in a preferred position as compared with commer-
cial banks. The benefits include: (1) the higher interest rates allowable
on time and savings deposits under federal law; 108 (2) certain tax ad-
vantages over commercial banks; i" and (3) lower required reserve
levels.110
105 Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 168 App., 1 2-17 (1971) provides:
The portions of the deposits of all member banks which shall have become
members of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, in excess of . . . [the
maximum amount] covered by the [FDIC] insurance . , . shall continue to be
insured in full by the Deposit Insurance Fund ... .
(Footnote omitted.)
100 See note 104 supra.
101 Act of June 7, 1972, ch. 381, 1 1, Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 168, 1 3711.
108 The federal regulations governing the rates of interest provide that savings banks
may pay 5% on regular savings accounts, compared to the maximum of 41/2% which may
be paid by commercial banks. On "ninety-day notice" accounts the maximum interest rates
are 5'A% for savings banks and 5% for commercial banks. In Massachusetts, the differ-
ences are even greater, since savings banks in that state may pay 51/2% on regular savings
and 51/2% on ninety-day notice accounts. Koplow, supra note 94, at 17, cal. 3.
109 Compare 26 C.F.R. 11 1.581-.584 (1972), with id. at 11 1.591-.594.
110 While the Federal Reserve Board's Regulation D does not distinguish between
commercial banks and savings banks, it does require lower reserve levels on time and
savings deposits than it does on demand deposits. See note 58 supra. Since savings banks
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In addition, the expansion of savings bank powers is likely to af-
fect branch banking laws on the state level. In the typical case, banks
are restricted from operating branch offices in towns or cities in which
they would be competing directly with other banks already established
there.'" The obvious reason for these restrictions is to protect the com-
petitive position of the smaller banks. In Massachusetts, for example,
the competitive element between savings banks and commercial banks
was for many years considered to be minimal, and consequently these
types of institutions were permitted to operate branches in the same
communities. 112
 Today, however, with savings banks offering NOW
accounts and credit cards, the competition has been made more direct,
so that the competitive position of a small commercial bank in a rural
or suburban area of the state is likely to be endangered by the mutual
savings bank down the street. As has been pointed out by the Massa-
chusetts Commissioner of Banks: "This policy [of permitting savings
banks and commercial banks to operate branches in the same commu-
nities] will definitely have to be re-evaluated in the light of recent de-
velopments.""8
B. Effect on Traditional Banking Practices
In addition to its effect on the competitive balance, the impact of
the NOW account on traditional notions of sound banking practice
poses a variety of problems. It is the contention of commercial bankers
that the institution of third-party payment accounts in savings banks
constitutes a threat to the safety and integrity of the total banking
structure."' In this regard, consideration must be given to the specific
problems created by the NOW account.
1. Reserve Requirements
A principal source of potential danger is the fact that reserve re-
quirements are considerably lower for savings deposits than for demand
deposits."' The reason behind this disparity is that demand deposits
are more susceptible to sizable withdrawals at any given moment than
are savings deposits. The nature of the deposits indicates why this is so.
Savings accounts are generally used by depositors in order to safeguard
their residual savings, while demand deposit balances are usually main-
tained at levels sufficient to cover estimated bills and other expenses.
The very idea behind demand deposits is to permit the customer to
have most of their deposits in time and savings accounts while commercial banks carry
mostly demand deposit accounts, the net effect of this regulation is lower reserve re-
quirements for savings banks.
111 See, e.g., Conn. Gen. Stat. Rev. 36-59 (Supp. 1972-73), 36-129 (1969) ; N.H.
Rev. Stat. Ann. 4 384-B:2 (1968).
112 Koplow, supra note 94, at 27, col. 1.
118
 Id.
114 Petition for Relief, supra note 65, at 2.
115 See note 58 supra.
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make immediate withdrawals, while the basis of a savings account is to
encourage the accumulation of savings through maximal deposits and
minimal withdrawals. Thus, in the normal course of operations, the
emphasis in checking accounts will be on withdrawals, and in savings
accounts on deposits. For this reason, the Federal Reserve Board has
imposed substantially higher reserve requirements on demand deposits,
in order to protect the banks and their customers from any unusually
heavy demand for withdrawals. Theoretically, at least, the demand for
savings withdrawals will never be as great on any given day as the de-
mand for checking withdrawals.
But when "checking" withdrawals are permitted to be made from
savings accounts, as is presently the case in Massachusetts savings
banks offering the NOW account, the situation changes. Withdrawals
from these accounts are likely to increase substantially, yet there is no
corresponding requirement imposing higher reserve levels. In fact, as
things now stand, Massachusetts savings banks, by virtue of their not
being member banks of the Federal Reserve System, are not even sub-
ject to the limited reserve requirements applicable to savings deposits.'
Thus, while commercial banks must maintain a federally prescribed
ratio of cash and highly liquid securities in order to cushion the effects
of greater-than-average checking transactions, savings banks are under
no such obligation, and their freedom to keep on hand low reserve
levels poses a potential threat to the safety of deposits.
2. Problems of Negotiability
The subtle distinction between the NOW account withdrawal order
and a conventional check poses problems of a different nature. The dis-
tinction referred to is, of course, the fact that although on their faces
the two instruments may be identical, the check is payable on demand
while the withdrawal order is subject by agreement to the imposition
of a ninety-day notice requirement.
What happens, then, to the maker, payee, or holder of the with-
drawal order if the bank decides to impose the notice requirement? Ob-
viously, there are many variations on this situation. The maker may
name himself as payee and be refused payment. He may name some-
one else as payee who has never heard of the NOW account and believes
the instrument to be a conventional "payable on demand" check; or
the payee may be well aware of the limitations imposed on the instru-
ment, but may indorse it over to a third party who takes without notice
of the restrictions. And what of the order of these occurrences? Is there
a distinction to be drawn between the depositor who, after being notified
by the bank that the notice requirement has been imposed, nevertheless
continues to write withdrawal orders in disregard of the bank's author-
110 According to Petition for Relief, supra note 65, at 12, the closest thing to a
reserve requirement on Maqqachusetts mutual savings banks is the mandatory assessment
imposed by the MSCF which may be as little as 1% of deposits.
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ity, and the one who, after properly executing several withdrawal in-
struments, is notified that the bank has chosen not to honor them for
ninety days?117
It must be remembered that in the vast majority of cases the bank
is not likely to impose any notice requirement, and none of the prob-
lems listed above is apt to occur.'" Should one occur, however, the fun-
damental consideration in assessing the problem must be what appears
on the face of the instrument. "The negotiability of an instrument is
always to be determined by what appears on the face of the instrument
alone, and if it is negotiable in itself a purchaser without notice of a
separate writing is in no way affected by it.""° The face of the NOW
account withdrawal order currently in use is virtually identical with
that of a conventional check, whose negotiability no one disputes. So
too is the NOW account withdrawal order a negotiable instrument un-
der the Uniform Commercial Code.'2° Furthermore, the withdrawal
order appears to fit the Code's definition of a "check," since it is drawn
on a bank and is payable on demand."'
Where the face of the NOW account withdrawal order and the
face of a regular check are exactly alike, it is difficult to imagine that
a holder of the former who takes without notice of the "condition"
117 It is not within the scope of this comment to attempt to answer all of these
questions. They are posed merely to suggest the range of problems presented by the NOW
withdrawal order.
118 See text at note 93 supra.
118 Uniform Commercial Code § 3-119, Comment S. Although § 3 - 119 is directed
toward "other writings" which are part of the same transaction as the negotiable instru-
ment, this language from Comment 5, read in light of other Code sections, appears to be
applicable to all agreements which ostensibly affect the negotiability of the instrument. Cf.
U.C.C. § 3-108, 3-109. [All citations to the Uniform Commercial Code will be to the
1972 Official Text.]
120
 The instrument contains all the attributes of negotiability set forth in U.C.C.
§ 3-104, since it:
(a) .	 [is] signed by the maker or drawer; and
(b) contain[s] an unconditional promise or order to pay a sum certain . . .;
and
(c) . [is] payable on demand or at a definite time; and
(d) [is] payable to order or to bearer.
U.C.C. §§ 3-104(1)(a)-(d).
121 A negotiable instrument is "a 'check' if it is a draft drawn on a bank and payable
on demand ...." U.C.C. § 3-104(2)(6). A negotiable instrument is "a 'draft' . if it is
an order...." U.C.C. § 3-104(2)(a). "An 'order' is a direction to pay and must be more
than an authorization or request . . . ." U.C.C. § 3-102(1)(b). "Instruments payable on
demand include ... those in which no time for payment is stated." U.C.C. § 3-108.
A distinction should be drawn between those instruments that are "payable on
demand" under the Uniform Commercial Code and those deposits that are classified as
"demand deposits" under Regulation Q and its FDIC counterpart. It will he recalled that
"demand deposits" are defined as those deposits that are not classified as time or savings
deposits. See text at notes 52, 61, 92-94 supra. They are defined with respect to the
depositor-bank relationship, and not to the Code's "payable on demand" concept that is
associated with negotiable instruments. Thus, a bank account whose deposits are with-
drawable via negotiable instruments that are payable on demand under the U.C.C. is not
necessarily a demand deposit account.
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should have fewer rights than a holder of the latter. Accordingly, it
would appear that under the Uniform Commercial Code the NOW
withdrawal order will be treated as a "check," and a payee or indorsee
will be a holder in due course.'" However, should the bank refuse to
pay the order on demand, the rights of the holder will lie only against
the maker of the order.'" This puts the holder of a dishonored NOW
account "check" in the position of seeking payment "on demand" from
the depositor-drawer, who himself probably cannot make a withdrawal
until the notice period has run because he, like his payee, is subject to
the notice provision in the account agreement.
Banks issuing NOW account withdrawal orders should be well
aware that such instruments are likely to find their way to all parts
of the country and to a great number of people who have never heard
of a NOW account. A bank which refuses to honor such an instrument
presented for payment by a holder in good faith does a disservice to
the typical payee or indorsee who accepts the instrument as what it
appears to be—a check that is payable on demand.
Furthermore, while the contention can be made that a person al-
ways accepts a check subject to certain implied conditions upon which
payment may be refused, such a contention lacks merit insofar as it is
offered as a means of resolving problems implicit in the NOW with-
drawal order's resemblance to a check. While it is true that a bank may
refuse payment for a variety of reasons (forgery, alteration, insufficient
funds, payment stopped, missing indorsement or signature, etc.),'"
such reasons are based upon improper or negligent conduct on the part
of the maker, and not on any fault attributable to the bank. To say
that the statutory authority to impose a notice requirement affecting
withdrawals is but another justifiable reason for refusal to pay is un-
tenable, because it is the conduct of the bank, insofar as it controls the
format of the withdrawal order, and not that of the depositor, upon
which this particular justification would rest.
It is submitted, therefore, that so long as the NOW account with-
drawal orders continue to resemble conventional checks, the reserved
authority of a bank to impose a notice requirement upon withdrawals
should not, as a matter of fairness, be permitted to defeat the rights
of a payee who takes without notice of such authority. However, in
states such as Massachusetts whose banking statutes provide savings
122
 See U.C.C. * 3-302.
128 U.C.C. § 3-409(1) provides: "A check or other draft does not of itself operate as
an assignment of any funds in the bands of the drawee available for its payment, and the
drawee is not liable on the instrument until he accepts it." "Acceptance" is defined in
3-410 as "the drawee's signed engagement to honor the draft as presented." Taken to-
gether, these two sections provide that the holder has no cause of action against the
payor--i.e., the bank—unless and until the bank expressly agrees to pay as directed by the
maker. Section 3-122(3) of the Code provides: "A cause of action against a drawer of a
draft ... accrues upon demand following dishonor of the instrument. Notice of dishonor
is a demand."
124 See U.C.C. I) 3-510, Comment 2.
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banks with the right to require ninety days notice of withdrawal from
their accounts,'" it would appear that a payee would not be permitted
to compel payment on demand.
In recognition of this problem, the suggestion has been made that "
disclosure of the bank's reserved authority to require notice of intent
to withdraw ought to be made mandatory by the use of a legend appear-
ing on the face of each withdrawal order."' Such a requirement would
assure banks issuing these instruments that all payees and subsequent
holders would be held to be aware of the notice condition. But just as
surely, such a requirement would pose a threat to the acceptability of
these instruments to the general public.'
3. The Check Collection Process
In addition to the possibility of public reluctance to accept NOW
account withdrawal orders, the disclosure of the notice requirement on
the face of the instrument might affect the internal operations of the
check collection process.'" Although checks and other items may be
processed through a bank clearinghouse system or through a Federal
Reserve Bank, the Federal Reserve procedure is often chosen because
of the "direct, expeditious, and economical' nature of its operation.
Thus, despite the fact that a mutual savings bank, which is state-
chartered, may not be a member of the Federal Reserve System, and
hence will not be subject to Regulation Q, it will nevertheless be sub-
ject to the Federal Reserve Board's Regulation J18° if it sends items for
collection through a Federal Reserve Bank.'" Regulation J "govern[s]
the collection of checks and other cash items and the collection of non-
cash items by the Federal Reserve banks."
Under current procedures, NOW account withdrawal orders are
processed as "cash items," in the same manner as checks.'" However,
188 See Mass Ann. Laws ch. 168, § 26(2) (1971), quoted in note 84 supra.
128 Koplow, supra note 94, at 27, col. 1.
127 Id.
128 For a detailed treatment of the check collection process and related material, see
B. Clark & A. SquWante, The Law of Bank Deposits, Collections and Credit Cards (1970).
12u 12 C.F.R. § 210.3 (1972).
180
 Id. at § 210.1-.16.
181
 Id. at § 210.1.
102 Id. at * 210.1(a).
188 Regulation J defines the terms "item," "cash item," and "noncash item" as
follows:
(a) The term "item" means any instrument for the payment of money,
whether negotiable or not, which is payable in a Federal Reserve district, is sent
by a sender or a nonbank depositor to a Federal Reserve bank for handling .
and is collectible in funds acceptable to the Federal Reserve bank of the district
in which the instrument is payable ..
(1) The term "cash item" means:
(1) Any check other than a check classified as a noncash item in accord-
ance with paragraph (j) of this section; or
(2) Any other item payable on demand ... which the Federal Reserve bank
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the Federal Reserve Banks have the authority to determine at their
own discretion what items shall be handled as cash items and what
items as noncash items.' In this regard, the Federal Reserve Bank of
Boston has issued an operating letter containing the following language:
We reserve the right, in our discretion, to return or to handle
as a noncash item any item which has previously been dis-
honored or if special conditions require that it be handled as
a noncash item, and this bank shall decide whether such spe-
cial conditions exist.'
It seems clear, then, that the Federal Reserve Banks have the au-
thority to deem the NOW account withdrawal order a "noncash item"
and to process it as such, especially if the "condition" relating to notice
of intent to withdraw were to be included on the face of the instrument.
Were these instruments to be treated as noncash items, their collection
process would be delayed considerably, since noncash items generally
"do not contain the full potential of payment ordinarily associated with
cash items,"188 and are therefore processed less quickly, resulting in
greater "uncollected" balances in the bank accounts of depositors who
accept them. This delay in collection might, therefore, pose another
threat to the acceptability of NOW account withdrawal orders by the
public. Consequently, it is apparent that the Federal Reserve Board's
power to regulate the collection process gives it the potential "to head
off [the] NOW [account] at the clearing house."'"
of the district in which the item is payable may be willing to accept as a cash
item.
(j) The term "noncash item" means any item which the receiving Federal
Reserve bank, in its operating letters, shall have classified as an item requiring
special handling and any item normally received by the Federal Reserve bank as
a cash item if such bank decides that special conditions require that it be handled
as a noncash item.
Id. at §§ 210.2(a), (1), (j) (footnote omitted).
184 Regulation J provides in part:
Each Federal Reserve bank shall issue operating letters . . . governing the
details of its operations in the handling of cash items and noncash items , . .
Such letters may, among other things, classify cash items and noncash items ..
Id. at § 210.16.
185 Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, Operating Letter No. 6, § 2, cited in Massachu-
setts Bankers Association and New Hampshire Bankers Association, Petition for Relief
with Respect to Third Party Withdrawal Orders Offered by Mutual Savings Banks, at 13
(Oct. 20, 1972) [hereinafter cited as Petition for Relief].
188 Petition for Relief, supra note 135, at 27. Items are
dealt with in bulk as "cash" items on the assumption that they will be honored
in the overwhelming majority of cases; provisional credits are entered immediately
for [them] . . . at all stages of the collection process and automatically become
final without further action upon payment by the drawee bank. . . .
Farnsworth, Documentary Drafts Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 22 Bus. Law. 479,
482 (1967),
Items "are handled as 'collection' [noncash] items and dealt with individually, rather
than in bulk, . . . [when] no assumption is made that they will be honored, [and] no
credits, not even provisional credits, are given until the item has been paid .. ." Id.
187 TIME, Jan. 15, 1973, at 71.
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In surn, the NOW account needs to be viewed in relation both to
the competitive balance between savings banks and commercial banks
and to recent developments in traditional banking methods. When so
viewed, it is submitted, the institution of the NOW account poses a
variety of problems not considered by the Consumers court. It appears
likely, however, that the Consumers decision will not long remain the
only authority bearing on the legality of the NOW account. On the
state level, in the wake of an unenacted bill that would have authorized
Massachusetts savings banks to accept demand deposits,'" a special
legislative commission has been established to study the situation re-
lating to savings bank checking accounts.'" On the federal level, the
recent Hunt Commission report indicates that a broad-based reform of
federal banking regulation may be forthcoming.140
Despite the existence of factors that point toward the potential
dangers of the NOW account, it is highly unlikely that consumer-
minded legislators will overturn the Consumers decision by enacting
legislation designed to prohibit entirely the offering of third-party pay-
ment services by savings banks."' Rather, some form of compromise
188
 Mass. House Bill No. 1986 (1971).
189
 Mass. House Bill No. 5455 (1971). Among the areas under investigation are:
(a) the availability of funds for home financing;
(b) the economic effect on the banking industry;
(c) the economic effect on the citizens of Massachusetts;
(d) the effects on taxation;
(e) the effects on reserve requirements;
(f) the report of the Hunt Commission;
(g) the experience of other states.
149
 See Hunt Commission, supra note 102. The Hunt Commission report is likely to
be a basis for future legislative action in the area of banking reform. The Commission was
charged with the duty to "'review and study the structure, operation, and regulation of
the private financial institutions in the United States, for the purpose of formulating
recommendations that would improve the functioning of the private financial system.'"
Id. at 1 (quoting President Nixon).
The Commission advanced a number of proposals affecting all areas of the banking
industry. In assessing the current state of federal banking law, it remarked that "the
changes that have occurred in private institutions and in the markets they serve reflect
efforts by the financial system to adapt to fundamental economic changes in a regulatory
climate that has not adapted to these new conditions." Id. at 12. For this reason, if the
recommendations offered by the Commission are implemented, they would constitute a
broad-based reform of the American banking structure, and by their nature would result
in a system of freer competition among financial intermediaries.
Specific recommendations affecting mutual savings banks and indicative of the Hunt
Commission's desire to relax the regulation of banking institutions include proposals:
(1) that the Federal Reserve Board's power to set interest rate ceilings on time and
savings deposits be exercised on a standby basis only, but that the prohibition against the
payment of interest on demand deposits be retained, id. at 23, 27;
(2) that mutual savings banks be given greater loan and investment powers, id. at
31;
(3) that mutual savings banks be granted the authority to offer a wider range of time
and savings deposits, certificates of deposit, and third-party payment services, id. at 33;
and
(4) that federal charters be available to thrift institutions that desire them, id. at 59.
141
 However, a bill to this effect has been filed in the Massachusetts House of
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proposals are likely to be adopted.' It is urged that legislators con-
sidering how far to broaden the functions of mutual savings banks
should take into account the mutuals' fundamental objectives of serving
the savings and mortgage markets. If savings banks now desire to offer
what are in essence commercial services, then they may be starting to
retreat from the traditional bases upon which they were founded. With
savings institutions nibbling at the temptation to expand into commer-
cial territory, the interests of the savings and mortgage markets, as well
as those of the public at large, might best be served by affixing a price
tag to the granting of the authority to engage in such activities. Thus,
it would seem sensible to require savings banks to relinquish at least a
portion of their benefits, such as their higher interest rates, in exchange
for the added competitive advantage that third-party payment accounts
now afford them 148
CONCLUSION
The institution of the NOW account marks an effort to broaden
the functions of savings banks in Massachusetts. In this regard, there
is reason for concern over its " 'potential for disrupting the financial
Representatives by the Massachusetts Independent Bankers Association. Boston Sunday
Globe, Jan. 14, 1973, at 34-B, col. 6.
142 The Massachusetts Bankers Association and the New Hampshire Bankers Asso-
ciation, representing the commercial banks in those states, have suggested four alternative
solutions to the problems created by the NOW account. These proposals, in the order of
preference to the commercial banks, are: (1) the complete prohibition of third-party
payment accounts in savings banks; (2) the prohibition of any interest payments on such
accounts; (3) the granting to commercial banks of the authority to offer this type of
account, and the setting of a maximum interest rate of 1-2% on all such accounts; or
(4) the granting to all banks, commercial as well as savings, of the authority to offer
such accounts, with the 5 ,A% interest rate applicable to all banks. Petition for Relief,
supra note 135, at 25-26.
In addition, the commercial banks have petitioned the following agencies and officials,
requesting: (1) that the Federal Reserve Board classify the NOW account withdrawal
orders as noncash items, or, in the alternative, permit commercial banks to pay 5;4%
interest on their demand deposits; (2) that the FDIC Board subject mutual savings
banks to the same restrictions imposed on other insured banks, by eliminating their
exemption under 12 C.F.R. 329.0 (1972) (see text at note 64 supra) ; (3) that the
Massachusetts Commissioner of Banks issue a regulation similar to Regulation Q, to be
applicable to all Massachusetts savings banks; (4) that the MSCF prohibit its member
banks from offering third-party payment accounts; and (5) that the Attorney General
of Massachusetts petition the Supreme Judicial Court for a rehearing of the Consumers
case, and that he investigate the possibility that the failure of the savings banks to indi-
cate either on their withdrawal orders or in their advertisements that each bank may
require up to ninety days written notice of withdrawal constitutes an unfair or deceptive
practice under Mass, Ann, Laws ch. 93A, § 2 (1971). Petition for Relief, supra note 135, at
27-31.
141 An alternative proposal would be to permit all banks, commercial as well as
savings, to offer the NOW account, although in light of Regulation Q such a proposal
would appear to be unworkable unless the federal regulatory scheme is substantially
revised.
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stability' of the banking structure"1" not only in Massachusetts, but
in other states where mutual savings banks may attempt to introduce
it. It appears that any mutual savings bank that is not a member of the
Federal Reserve System, and thus not subject to Regulation Q, is poten-
tially able to offer a service similar to the NOW account, so long as its
state-granted charter and the state regulatory laws permit it to do so.
Membership in the FDIC alone will not inhibit it. However, the granting
of such new and potentially disruptive powers to savings banks ought to
be exercised with the greatest degree of caution and foresight, and be
accompanied by changes, or at least by proposals for changes, that
would alleviate disruption and promote the long-range benefits of the
new development.
The Consumers decision, while accurate in its reasoning that
Massachusetts law, permits savings bank deposits to be withdrawn by
means of negotiable withdrawal orders, supplies neither the caution, nor
the foresight, nor the proposals for change that are necessary to protect
banks and depositors from the potential problems that are presented
by the expansion of savings banks into commercial areas. Indeed, had
the court attempted to consider the many complex financial and eco-
nomic problems presented by the NOW account, it would arguably
have been overstepping its judicial boundaries and invading the legis-
lative province. As a result, the questions left unanswered by the court's
decision indicate the urgent need for legislative action to supplement
the initial groundwork laid down by the Consumers case.
To this end, it is necessary that state and federal authorities chan-
nel their efforts toward a comprehensive analysis of the problems in-
volved in instituting essentially commercial services, such as third-party
payment accounts, in savings banks. Every new power granted to these
institutions will have an impact upon the competitive balance between
commercial banks and thrift institutions, and it is the responsibility
of banking authorities to insure that the balance is not upset. Nor is it
wise to permit expanded services to threaten the safety of bank deposits,
as where deposits that are in essence payable on demand are not backed
by sufficient reserve levels. It is hoped that future legislative action in
this area will reflect those considerations that are vital to the safety
and stability of the banking industry.*
ALAN J. KAPLAN
144 Boston Globe, Oct. 6, 1972, at 37, col. 6 (statement of Frank Morris, President of
the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston).
* As this comment went to press, two bills pertaining to the NOW account were
introduced in Congress. H.R. 4070 is "[a] bill . . . to prohibit depository institutions
from permitting negotiable orders of withdrawal to be made with respect to any deposit
or account on which any interest . . . is paid." H.R. 4070, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted
in 119 Cong. Rec. H874 (daily ed. Feb. 7, 1973). S. 1008 is "[a] bill .. . to make clear
that Federal banking statutes do not prohibit depository institutions from offering nego-
tiable order of withdrawal services in connection with certain interest-bearing deposits."
S. 1008, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in 119 Cong. Rec. 53212 (daily ed. Feb. 26, 1973).
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